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T here are two mutually exclusive hypotheses inherent to Putnam’s doctrine of meaning.  On the one hand Put-nam privileges a form of scientific realism in determin-ing the correct application of our use of natural-kind 
terms.  On the other hand Putnam offers a Wittgensteinian exter-
nalist hypothesis, claiming that “[o]ur talk of apples and fields is 
intimately connected with our non-verbal transactions with ap-
ples and fields.”1  The first hypothesis I will dub Putnam’s 
‘Semantic Scientism’ hypothesis; the second as his externalism 
hypothesis.   
It is my intention in this paper to illustrate the tension be-
tween these two hypotheses, and ultimately, to assert that with-
out the externalism hypothesis Putnam’s semantic theory is 
grossly incomplete.  With the externalism hypothesis, Putnam 
cannot hold to what I have called his ‘Semantic Scientism’.  
Though I have given a novel name to Putnam’s first thesis (the 
‘Semantic Scientism’ hypothesis), I am far from the first to dis-
cuss the thesis.  A similar thesis was attributed to Putnam by 
Gregory McCulloch in his book The Mind and Its World.  
McCulloch calls this thesis the doctrine that the ‘understanding 
tracks real-essence’.  Although I disagree with the explanation 
McCulloch gives for this phenomenon, I do believe that Putnam 
A recent graduate of Wilfrid Laurier University in Waterloo, Canada, 
Gregory is now undergoing firsthand experience of radical interpreta-
tion while teaching English as a second language just outside of Seoul 
in South Korea.  Before venturing off to the Asia Pacific, in 2006 he was 
awarded funding by the Arts Students Advancement Program at 
Wilfrid Laurier University, to present “Hilary Putnam’s Semantic Sci-
entism: A Critique” at the 8th Annual Rocky Mountain Philosophy 
Conference in Boulder, Colorado.  Gregory plans to continue his stud-
ies in philosophy by attending graduate school and specializing in 
questions surrounding mental content, and epistemological issues sur-
rounding ascriptions of mental content. 
holds to some form of this doctrine.  Thus, in order to introduce 
what I take to be Putnam’s theory of meaning, I will summarize 
the main points McCulloch highlights concerning Putnam’s se-
mantic doctrine. 
The “understanding tracks real essence” doctrine that 
McCulloch employs the Lockean distinction between real and 
nominal essence in an effort to characterize Putnam’s semantic 
doctrine, and I will follow suit.  For Locke, the nominal essence 
of, say, lead, “is the cluster of superficial qualities by which we 
typically recognize something to be lead.”2  Lockean real essence, 
on the other hand, “is the hidden structure which causes samples 
of lead to have the superficial qualities they do have.”3  Locke 
invokes a gap between the mind’s idea about a substance and the 
real essence of a substance.  Under a Lockean account, “what 
makes something a sample of a particular substance is that it 
should answer to the substance’s nominal essence.”4  That is, we do 
not 
 
rank and sort things…by their real essences, be-
cause… our faculties carry us no further towards 
the knowledge and distinctions of substances than 
a collection of those sensible ideas which we ob-
serve in them.5  
 
Thus, for Locke, we rank and sort things according to what is 
sensible to us, namely, our ideas of their nominal essence.  There 
is, however, a problem with such a conception once we examine 
what our understanding of a substance-term is supposed to in-
clude.  On Locke’s account we are limited to our ideas of nomi-
nal essence to rank, sort, and understand substance-terms, when 
what a substance’s essence really includes is something beyond 
our grasp.  McCulloch characterizes the problem for Locke as not 
depending the fact that a substance’s real essence is unknown to us, 
but rather in the fact that our understanding of a substance-term 
is “self-contained” with respect to its real essence:  
 
in the precise sense that the facts about the under-
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standing (the entertaining of ideas of the nominal 
essence) can remain the way they are in them-
selves whatever the facts about real essence, and 
even, indeed, if there are no real essences at all.6   
 
Thus for Locke, only ideas before one’s mind, ideas constituting 
a substance’s nominal essence, can contribute to one’s under-
standing of a substance-term.  In Putnam’s terms, only our stereo-
type determines or contributes to our understanding of a sub-
stance-term. 
 Here is where Putnam and Locke first differ: Putnam 
claims that something’s fitting the stereotype (nominal essence) 
of a substance is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a sample 
of that substance.  Given that we could have atypical samples of 
a given substance which do not fit the stereotype (but are still the 
same substance), and different substances that fit the same 
stereotype, it seems we cannot rely on the stereotype to deter-
mine what substance a given sample is.  According to Putnam, 
what determines whether something is a sample of a given sub-
stance is its real essence.  Putnam claims that “what we under-
stand, say, ‘water’ to apply to” is that which has water’s real es-
sence.7  Thus, we understand something to be water “if and only 
if it has water’s real essence”, not if it has the same nominal es-
sence, or stereotype as water.8  McCulloch characterizes this part 
of Putnam’s program by saying that “the understanding tracks real 
essence.”9    
 To flesh out the rest of Putnam’s program we need to ex-
amine his influential ‘Twin Earth’ thought experiment.  
McCulloch claims that this thought experiment is supposed to 
illustrate that something’s “fitting the stereotype [of a given sub-
stance] is not sufficient to be a sample of [that] substance…
because what happen to be different substances may have the 
same stereotype.”10  Putnam’s thought experiment may indeed 
illustrate this point.  His thought experiment does not illustrate 
why we should privilege scientific classifications in determining 
what we mean by our use of a given term.  It is my contention 
that we are given no support for what I have dubbed his 
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‘Semantic Scientism’ hypothesis. 
 
The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ 
The crux of the Twin Earth thought experiment presents 
us with a dilemma.  We are asked to consider someone using the 
term ‘water’ in an attempt to speak about a substance that super-
ficially resembles (or has the same nominal essence as) a glass of 
water, but in this imagined case the substance in the glass is mi-
cro-chemically distinct from the substance that we call ‘water’.  
Putnam claims that the use of the term ‘water’ in this case would 
be incorrect.  Instead of our old, familiar H2O, Putnam has us 
imagine a substance (twater) with a vastly different chemical 
structure (abbreviated as ‘XYZ’) which fills the role on Twin 
Earth that water plays here on Earth.  According to Putnam, we 
ought to sweep superficial similarities aside and adopt the view 
that someone from our planet visiting Twin Earth would mean 
and understand something different than Twin Earthians by the 
term ‘water’.  Putnam presents his program succinctly in the fol-
lowing passage: 
 
My ‘ostensive definition’ of water has the follow-
ing empirical presupposition: that the body of liq-
uid I am pointing to bears a certain sameness rela-
tion (say, x is the same liquid as y, or x is the sameL as 
y) to most of the stuff I and other speakers in my 
linguistic community have on other occasions 
called ‘water.’11 
 
The mere fact that Twin Earthians use a word that superficially 
resembles our term ‘water’ to speak about a substance that su-
perficially resembles H2O is not enough to constitute the Twin 
Earth term ‘water’ as referring to actual water.  Putnam drives 
home this point about ‘resemblance’ in “brains in a vat” with his 
discussion of an ant tracing lines in the sand that resemble a cari-
cature of Winston Churchill.  But, he states, “[t]he mere fact that 
the ‘picture’ bears a ‘resemblance’ to Churchill does not make it 
into a real picture, nor does it make it a representation of Chur-
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chill.”12  Resemblance to a representation is not sufficient for rep-
resentation.  Or, in Putnam’s terminology, “qualitative similarity 
to something which represents an object…does not make a thing 
a representation all by itself.”13 
At this point it may seem as though what accounts for 
how a substance term refers to a given substance’s real essence is 
intention.14  McCulloch perpetuates this idea when summarizing 
Putnam’s position as follows, 
 
[A]ccording to Putnam, we intend our substance-
words to make classifications which are sensitive 
to the regularities exhibited by these underlying 
[real essence] factors…[n]ot that we (or anyone) 
need know what these are.15 
 
McCulloch traces the different understandings of ‘water’ for 
Earthians and Twin Earthians to a difference in the intentions of 
language users in our two worlds.  Or as McCulloch puts it, “Our 
intentions concerning the word ‘water; exclude XYZ and include 
H2O, theirs do the opposite.”16  
But Putnam does not claim this, as for obvious reasons it 
seems impossible that one could intend something without being 
able to think about it.  As Putnam states: 
 
to have the intention that anything, even private 
language (even the words ‘Winston Churchill’ 
spoken in my mind and not out loud), should rep-
resent Churchill, I must have been able to think 
about Churchill in the first place.17 
 
In short, what propositional attitudes like intentions ‘track’ de-
pends on what our thoughts represent.  What our thoughts rep-
resent depends on what the words specifying those thoughts 
represent.  So what those words represent cannot depend on 
what our intentions track without circularity.  The dependence 
must go the other way around.   
 
Hilary Putnam’s Semantic Scientism 39 
Semantic Scientism, Scientific Realism, and Linguistic Com-
munities 
So what, according to Putnam, accounts for the supposed 
fact that our understanding tracks real essence?  This is not at all 
clear. 
 McCulloch and Putnam seem to conflate two independ-
ent points.  McCulloch states that according to Putnam what de-
termines whether something is a sample of a given substance is its 
real essence.  McCulloch then commits a non-sequitor, and counts 
this claim as implying that “what…we understand ‘water’ to ap-
ply to” is only samples with water’s real essence.18  Even if we 
grant Putnam and McCulloch the claim that something’s fitting 
the stereotype (having the same nominal essence) of a given sub-
stance is neither necessary nor sufficient for that something to be 
a sample of a substance, and we grant the supposition that to be 
a sample of a given substance, that sample must have the same 
real essence as the given substance, it does not follow that we would 
understand ‘water’ to apply only to samples with the real essence H2O.  
Putnam concedes that “A and B can be syntactically and phoneti-
cally the same word in two different languages (or in two differ-
ent dialects or idiolects of the same language) and yet have differ-
ent reference.”19  This isn’t to reduce the debate to the level of 
syntax or phonetics, but to elucidate the point Putnam conceded 
earlier: resemblance to a representation is not sufficient for repre-
sentation.  
  Why are we committed to scientific realism to determine 
the meaning (and correct application) of our terms?  Perhaps in 
matters where scientific classification is relevant for determining 
what things are, we can rely on science.  But science has no au-
thority in terms of classification when we are speaking of manu-
factured (or social) kinds, i.e. chairs, and gloves.  Rather, chairs 
have no real essence; only a nominal essence.  What does under-
standing track in the case of manufactured kinds?  I am assum-
ing here that Putnam’s externalist theory of understanding must 
accommodate kinds other than natural-kinds, as it seems that 
later in his work, he requires the adoption of this assumption  – 
‘vats’ are not a natural-kind, but his argument for why “I am a 
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brain in a vat” is self-defeating applies his externalism to the 
word ‘vat.’20 
 To elucidate the contrast between Putnam’s semantic ap-
proach to social-kind terms and natural-kind terms, consider two 
examples from Representation and Reality: the terms ‘bonnet’ and 
‘robin’.  Putnam considers both terms as used in British English 
and American English.  ‘Bonnet’, Putnam states,  
 
is phonetically (and in spelling) the same words in 
American English and in British English, but in 
British English ‘bonnet’ can denote the hood of a 
car, whereas it cannot in American English.21 
 
The situation is similar in the case of ‘robin’, where the term 
“does not refer to the same species of bird in England and in the 
United States.”22  In this latter case, presumably the reason why 
‘robin’ as uttered on the lips of an Englishman does not refer to 
the same species as when the same term is uttered on the lips of 
an American, is because there are different species of bird in Eng-
land and the United States which are called by the same term: 
‘robin’.  All of this is simply to reiterate Putnam’s earlier point 
that phonetic and syntactic similarity of terms (or even in this 
case where the terms are identical phonetically and syntactically) 
is not sufficient for co-extension.   
What is interesting is the explanation as to how the terms 
‘robin’ and ‘bonnet’ as uttered in the United States and in Britain 
are supposed to have different (respective) extensions.  In the 
case of ‘robin’, Putnam can (in his explanation of its reference) 
default to his linguistic division of labour.  Putnam claims that 
we can rely on “experts” in our linguistic community to be able 
to understand natural-kind terms, such that my use of a natural-
kind term like ‘water’ means H2O and not XYZ, even though I 
might not know water’s real essence.  In this vein, Putnam claims 
that his use of the terms ‘beech’ and ‘elm’ have different mean-
ings in his linguistic community (and he claims he understands 
the term) even if he cannot tell the difference between the two 
types of tree.  Putnam characterizes the program succinctly in the 
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following passage. 
 
Every linguistic community…possesses at least 
some terms whose acquainted ‘criteria’ are known 
only to a subset of the speakers who acquire the 
terms, and whose use by the other speakers de-
pends upon a structured cooperation between 
them and the speakers in the relevant subset… In 
case of doubt, other speakers would rely on the 
judgment of these ‘expert’ speakers.23 
 
Though ‘robin’ could presumably be considered a natural-kind 
term, in the case of ‘bonnet’, all we have to fix the reference of 
the term in our respective communities is the linguistic doings of 
others in our linguistic communities.  We cannot default to real 
essence (or experts acquainted with real essence) to fix the refer-
ence of a term like ‘bonnet’, as the reference for such a term is 
constituted by the use to which others in one’s linguistic commu-
nity give to it.  But here it seems as though Putnam’s scientific 
realism is not doing any work in determining the meaning of our 
terms; the work is done by the linguistic practices of others 
whether or not those others speak the language of science, and 
whether or not they are speaking of scientific (natural) kinds or 
manufactured kinds. 
 This produces a strange problem.  To be clear, Putnam is 
claiming that we can rely on a special subclass of speakers within 
our linguistic community to fix the meaning of a natural-kind 
term to a particular substance’s real essence, and for manufac-
tured kinds, the meaning of our terms is determined by the “the 
use of a word by other speakers” in our community.24  My ques-
tion is this: how do we differentiate between those people who 
are members of our linguistic community but who consistently 
use a term incorrectly, and those who are speaking a different 
language or dialect, (and so, presumably belong to a different 
linguistic community)?  Wittgenstein claimed that there was no 
difference between these two options, which thus spawned cer-
tain rule-following problems.  A relevant criticism of Putnam 
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arises once we realize that we fail to make any real distinction 
here.  Where do we draw the boundary surrounding our linguis-
tic community?25 
 Furthermore, Putnam expresses his externalism with the 
Wittgensteinian claim that “[o]ur talk of apples and fields is inti-
mately connected with our non-verbal transactions with apples 
and fields.”26  Why should we assume that Putnam’s non-verbal 
transactions with beeches and elms are different transactions, 
when he can’t tell the difference between the two?  Given that 
Putnam cannot tell the difference between elms and beeches, we 
must assume that his non-verbal transactions with beeches are 
no different than his non-verbal transactions with elms.  It would 
seem that if we held Putnam to this Wittgensteinian claim, then 
his use of the terms ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ would have the same exten-
sion.  Understanding, in the case of Putnam’s understanding of 
‘elm’ and ‘beech’, does not track real essence.  
 At this point it might be objected that if it is the case that 
Putnam’s use of ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ have the same extension, this 
is not due to the fact that the understanding does not track real 
essence.  Putnam’s use of ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ having the same ex-
tension, while holding to Semantic Scientism, is ipso facto reason 
to deny that Putnam understands the terms ‘elm’ and ‘beech’.  
What we have here, as the objection might be presented, is a case 
of misunderstanding, and what the understanding tracks in the 
case of misunderstanding is irrelevant to Putnam’s Semantic Sci-
entism hypothesis. 
 However, the contrast between using the terms “with un-
derstanding” and “misunderstanding” the terms simply rein-
states the contrast between correct and incorrect usage of the 
terms.  We cannot adjudicate between a speaker’s correct and 
incorrect uses by appeal to the verbal practices of a linguistic 
community without first assigning that speaker to the right lin-
guistic community.  The point of my objection is that Putnam has 
no criterion for making such assignments, and so no basis for a 
contrast between misspeaking and using a word with a different 
meaning.  He certainly has no criterion that compels us to assign 
him to the same linguistic community as those botanical experts 
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who – by his own admission – use their words “beech” and 
“elm” so very differently than Putnam uses his words “beech” 
and “elm”.  Putnam’s view that meaning is determined by our 
nonverbal transactions with objects is thus in tension with his 
Semantic Scientism, which supposes the role that our own uses 
of words has in determining their meanings is to be over-ridden 
by the uses of the same-sounding words by others.  
 
Putnam’s ‘Beech-Elm’ 
Putnam assumes a fixed meaning within his linguistic 
community for ‘elm’ and ‘beech’, such that his being a member 
of that community guarantees that his use of ‘elm’ means elm 
and not beech.  But this assumption is in tension with his Witt-
gensteinian claim that “talk of [elms and beeches] is intimately 
connected with our non-verbal transactions with” elms and 
beeches.27  Putnam resolves this tension by relying on the non-
verbal transactions with elms and beeches of other people in his 
linguistic community to fix the meaning of the terms ‘elm’ and 
‘beech’.  But to assume a fixed meaning for the terms, Putnam is 
required to assume that his conception of a linguistic community 
is coherent – something which has not demonstrated. 
 It would seem that Putnam’s Semantic Scientism hy-
pothesis has a number of problems.  His Twin Earth thought ex-
periment is supposed to push us towards the intuition that, 
given the discovery that what we Earthians call ‘water’ is chemi-
cally different from what the Twin Earthians call ‘water’, we 
ought to say that our two cultures mean different things by 
‘water’.  But why would we not at this point of discovery say 
that ‘water’ is actually two substances: XYZ and H2O?  Putnam 
does not seem to provide a relevant reason for rejecting this 
equally plausible option.     
 I accept Putnam’s Wittgensteinian claim that what the 
term ‘water’ means is intimately connected with our non-verbal 
transactions with water.  Holding to this claim, why should we 
assume that the meaning of a natural-kind term is any different 
than any other term used outside the practice of science?  While 
‘water’ may be correctly applied within the practice of science to 
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samples of H2O only, someone using the term ‘water’ outside of 
the practice of science isn’t held to the semantic standards set by 
those in the practice of science.  Chemists may be experts con-
cerning the chemistry of water, but their usage of the term has no 
privileged status vis-à-vis the meaning of “water”.  Recall Put-
nam’s discussion of an ant tracing lines in the sand, where he 
states, “qualitative similarity to something which represents [a 
substance] does not make that thing a representation all by it-
self.”28  Why should we assume that qualitative similarity to a 
representation employed in science constitutes a term as being a 
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